Impact Bias: The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation by Guthrie, Chris & Sally, David
Marquette Law Review
Volume 87
Issue 4 Special Issue Article 19
Impact Bias: The Impact of the Impact Bias on
Negotiation
Chris Guthrie
David Sally
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Chris Guthrie and David Sally, Impact Bias: The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87 Marq. L. Rev. (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol87/iss4/19
THE IMPACT OF THE IMPACT BIAS ON
NEGOTIATION
CHRIS GUTHRIE* & DAVID SALLY**
The defining feature of "principled"' or "problem-solving ' 2 negotiation is
its emphasis on "interests" rather than "positions." In negotiation parlance,
"positions" are what disputants declare they want. 3 "Interests," on the other
hand, "are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. 'A They are the
"needs, desires, concerns, and fears" 5 that underlie stated positions.6
Disputants routinely negotiate over positions. "Each side takes a position,
argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise."7 Unfortunately,
however, "[c]ompromising between positions is not likely to produce an
agreement which will effectively take care of the human needs that led people
to adopt those positions."8
Proponents of problem-solving negotiation thus argue that disputants
should strive not merely to assert positions but rather to identify and satisfy
their underlying interests. Indeed, according to the proponents of this
approach to negotiation, "the object of a negotiation is to satisfy underlying
interests." 9 On this view, disputants should try to get what they really want at
the bargaining table.
But what if they do not know what they really want?
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior and Economics, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate
School of Management, Cornell University. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, we thank
Jayne Seminare Docherty, Chris Honeyman, and Nancy Welsh.
1. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
3. FISHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 41 ("Your position is something you have decided upon.").
4. Id.
5. Id. at 40.
6. Id. at 41 ("Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of
positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to
so decide.").
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id.
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I. IMPACT BIAS
Researchers from an emerging movement within psychology-variously
labeled "positive psychology'1° or "hedonic psychology"" or "affective
forecasting" 2-have learned a great deal in recent years about what people
really want. Of greatest relevance to this essay, researchers studying affective
forecasting have discovered that people are often mistaken about what they
want or what will make them happy. In more technical terms, people often
find that what they predict they want or how they predict they will feel-i.e.,
their "predicted utility"-is different from their actual experience-i.e., their
"experienced utility."' 3
It is not that people are entirely unaware of what they want or how they
will feel. In fact, people are generally quite skilled at predicting whether they
will feel positively or negatively about some event or item.' 4  People
accurately predict, for example, that they will feel favorably about a
promotion and unfavorably about a demotion. Similarly, people are generally
pretty good at predicting the specific emotion(s) they will experience upon
obtaining some item or experiencing some event. 15  People anticipate, for
instance, that they will feel pride and joy upon being promoted and anger and
embarrassment upon being demoted.
What people struggle with, however, is predicting both the intensity and
duration of their emotional reactions to an event or outcome. One's sense of
well-being turns significantly on this kind of prediction:
10. See, e.g., Martin E. P. Seligman & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Positive Psychology: An
Introduction, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (2000) ("The field of positive psychology at the subjective level
is about valued subjective experiences: well-being, contentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope
and optimism (for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present).").
11. See, e.g., WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix (Daniel
Kahneman et al., eds., 1999) [hereinafter WELL-BEING] ("Hedonic psychology.., is the study of
what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant. It is concerned with feelings of pleasure and
pain, of interest and boredom, of joy and sorrow, and of satisfaction and dissatisfaction."); Richard
M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci. On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on
Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 141 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES
SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 346 (2003) (defining "affective forecasting" as "people's predictions about their
future feelings"). For an accessible introduction to this line of research, see Jon Gertner, The Futile
Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at 44.
13. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY
105, 107-16 (1997).
14. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 12, at 347 (observing that "[i]n general ... people make
accurate predictions about which side of the neutral point their emotional experiences will fall,
especially if they have had experience in that domain").
15. Id. at 401 (observing that "[p]eople are also skilled at guessing the specific kinds of
emotional reactions they will have").
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Often people predict correctly the valence of their emotional reactions
("I'll feel good if I get the job") and correctly predict the specific
emotions they will experience (e.g., joy). Even when achieving such
accuracy, however, it is important for people to predict what the initial
intensity of the reaction will be (how much joy they will experience)
and the duration of that emotion (how long they will feel this way). It
is useful to know that we will feel happy on our first day at a new job,
but better to know how happy and how long this feeling will last,
before committing ourselves to a lifetime of work as a tax attorney. It
is helpful to know that it will be painful to end a long-term
relationship, but better to know how painful and whether the pain will
last half a second or half a decade.16
Unfortunately, people have a tendency "to overestimate the impact of
future events on their emotional lives."' 7 Psychologists Daniel Gilbert and
Timothy Wilson refer to this phenomenon as the "impact bias."' 8
Researchers have found that the impact bias influences reactions to all
kinds of life events, including "romantic breakups, personal insults, sports
victories, electoral defeats, parachute jumps, failures to lose weight, reading
tragic stories, and learning the results of pregnancy and HIV tests."' 9 With
few exceptions, people tend to overestimate the emotional impact such events
will have on their lives.
Researchers are not entirely sure why people overestimate the emotional
impact of various life events and outcomes, but they have identified at least
two phenomena that systematically point people in this direction.20  First,
when predicting reactions to a future event, people tend to ignore the impact
that other events are likely to have on their sense of well-being. People, in
other words, are prone to "focalism '' 2' or a "focusing illusion., 22  Second,
16. Id at 349.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 353.
20. In their article, Wilson and Gilbert discuss other phenomena that may contribute to the
impact bias-such as "framing effects," "expectation effects," and "intrapersonal empathy gaps"-
but these phenomena do not lead systematically to overestimation. See id. at 354-66; see also infra,
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
21. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 12, at 366 ("Events do not occur in a vacuum of course, but in
the rich context of many other events in people's lives. By neglecting to consider how much these
other events will capture their attention and influence their emotions, people overestimate the impact
of the focal event.").
22. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A
Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. ScI. 340 (1998).
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people underestimate the extent to which they process an experience or
outcome psychologically to dampen its emotional impact. Upon experiencing
some event or outcome, people engage in what Wilson and Gilbert call
"sense-making processes"; 23 that is, they "inexorably explain and understand
events that were initially surprising and unpredictable, and this process lowers
the intensity of emotional reactions to the events. 24 In advance, however,
they fail to "anticipate how much they will transform events psychologically
in ways that reduce their emotional power."25
Other phenomena undoubtedly contribute to the impact bias. For
example, people may fall prey to the impact bias because they fail to
recognize that they have something akin to a happiness "set point" which does
not fluctuate too much regardless of life events.26 Also, research suggests that
people in a "hot" emotional state have a hard time anticipating how they will
react when they are in a "cold" emotional state, again suggesting that they
may overestimate the emotional impact of future events and outcomes.
27
Whatever its source, the existence of the impact bias means that people
often "miswant." Writing in a New York Times Magazine article, Jon Gertner
explains this as follows:
[W]e might believe that a new BMW will make life perfect. But it
will almost certainly be less exciting than we anticipated; nor will it
excite us for as long as predicted .... Gilbert and his collaborator
Tim Wilson call the gap between what we predict and what we
ultimately experience the "impact bias"-"impact" meaning the errors
we make in estimating both the intensity and duration of our emotions
and "bias" our tendency to err. The phrase characterizes how we
experience the dimming excitement over not just a BMW but also
over any object or event that we presume will make us happy. Would
a 20 percent raise or winning the lottery result in a contented life?
You may predict it will, but almost surely it will not turn out that way.
And a new plasma television? You may have high hopes, but the
impact bias suggests that it will almost certainly be less cool, and in a
shorter time, than you imagine. Worse, Gilbert has noted that these
23. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 12, at 371.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 374.
26. See DAVID LYKKEN, HAPPINESS (1999) (relying largely on studies of twins to argue that
we possess a "happiness set point" but that there are things we can nonetheless do to increase our
level of well-being).
27. See George Loewenstein & David A. Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future
Feelings, in WELL-BEING, supra note 11, at 85 (explaining the hot and cold empathy gap as one
source of hedonic prediction errors).
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mistakes of expectation can lead directly to mistakes in choosing what
we think will give us pleasure. He calls this "miswanting. '28
II. "MISWANTING" IN NEGOTIATION
The potential impact of the impact bias on negotiation is straightforward.
If people in general are likely to have difficulty determining what they really
want because of a tendency to overestimate how attaining that item will affect
their sense of well-being, disputants are also likely to have difficulty
identifying what they really want in negotiation for the very same reason. Just
like the consumer who erroneously believes he will be much happier if he
purchases a new BMW, the disputant seeking to obtain vindication from the
other side or financial security or whatever else may very well overestimate
how much obtaining it will contribute to her sense of well-being. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to speculate that the added complexity of a negotiation-in
particular, the tension and conflict between the negotiators-will make it even
more difficult for disputants to discern what they really want.
This has important implications for lawyers (and other agents) who
represent disputants in negotiation. Under the prevailing model of the lawyer-
client relationship-the so-called "client-centered" counseling model 29-the
client is viewed as a fully competent and autonomous actor who retains full
decisional authority over her case.30  The lawyer, by contrast, is a largely
passive and objective advisor who strives to avoid encroaching on client
autonomy in the decision-making process.
3 1
This model of the lawyer-client relationship is arguably embodied in
many of the ethical rules that govern lawyer conduct. For example, Rule 1.2
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter,, 32 and shall "consult
with the client as to the means by which [his objectives] are pursued. 3
Similarly, Canon 7-7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement
28. Gertner, supra note 12, at 46.
29. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (2d ed. 2001).
30. Id. at 282.
31. Id. at 288-89. This is not the only model, of course. Others include the "traditional" or
"directive" model and the more recently promulgated "collaborative" model. For a discussion, see
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L.
REV. 591 (2003).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2004).
33. Id.
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offer," 34 and Canon 7-8 provides that "the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself."
3 5
The client-centered approach to lawyering-both in theory and as
reflected in various ethical rules-is both sensible and respectful. After all,
the client is the principal, and the lawyer is merely the agent hired by the
client. The client "owns" the problem, and she will reap the primary benefit
(or bear the primary brunt) of the outcome. Thus, it seems appropriate to vest
decision-making power solely in her hands.
Research on the impact bias gives one pause, however, because it suggests
that clients may have great difficulty predicting accurately what they want out
of a negotiation. Even given this difficulty, the client will generally know
better than anyone else what she wants. But in some circumstances, her
lawyer may have insight into her wants that even she does not. Namely, in
those cases where the client is a "one-shotter ' 36 (perhaps in a divorce case or a
personal injury suit), and the lawyer is a "repeat player" 37 who has represented
dozens or even hundreds of similarly situated clients in like cases, it seems
possible that the lawyer might know better than the client what the client
really wants.
Suppose, for example, that a lawyer named "Linda" represents a client
named "Clint." Clint used to be an executive with Company X. He enjoyed
working at Company X, and several close friends remain there.
Unfortunately, Company X fired him a year ago despite good performance
evaluations. Clint believes, based on a couple of e-mails his former boss sent
to a friend, that he was terminated due to his race. After investigating Clint's
claim, Linda filed suit against Company X on Clint's behalf, asserting myriad
violations under Title VII.
Upon receiving a copy of the complaint, the lawyer for Company X
indicated that the company would like to meet to discuss settlement of Clint's
claim. Linda agreed. Before the settlement talks, she arranged a meeting with
Clint to make sure she understood his interests. At this meeting, Clint told
Linda he wanted "a lot of money." When pressed to explain why he wanted
"a lot of money," Clint explained that he wanted the money to provide a
luxurious lifestyle for himself and his family and to provide him with the
financial resources that would enable him to retire.
34. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (2001).
35. Id. at EC 7-8.
36. See Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead Speculating on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
37. See id.
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Armed with this information, Linda met with the lawyer from Company X
to discuss settlement. After lengthy discussions about the alleged facts, the
applicable law, Clint's interests, and Company X's interests, the lawyer for
Company X offered to settle the case by paying Clint a modest sum of money
reflecting his "back pay" and by rehiring him at Company X. He also
informed Linda that Company X had already fired Clint's former boss.
Linda told him she would discuss the offer with Clint. When she met with
him, she described some of the advantages associated with the offer, and she
also acknowledged some of the advantages associated with foregoing
settlement and proceeding to trial. Clint told her that he would rather go to
trial than accept the offer because he wanted the flexibility, financial security,
and lifestyle that a substantial award would bring.
Having represented several similarly situated clients in the past and
having familiarized herself with the research on affective forecasting, Linda is
skeptical that Clint truly understands what he wants. She worries that even if
he prevails at trial and recovers a sizeable award, his contentment with that
award will be short-lived. Indeed, she is familiar with a number of fairly
well-established research findings that lead her to believe that Clint will
ultimately be happier if he accepts the settlement offer and returns to work at
Company X. She knows, for example, that money (beyond a comfortable,
middle-class amount) contributes minimally to happiness.38 She knows that
friendships and social interaction, on the other hand, do increase one's sense
of well-being,39 and Clint has several close friends at Company X with whom
he will interact on a much more regular basis if he were to return. Finally, she
knows that people are happier when they are fully engaged in some
productive activity,4° and Clint seems to have had this kind of engagement at
38. See, e.g., Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, If We Are So Rich, Why Aren't We Happy?, 54 AM.
PSYCHOL. 821, 822-23 (1999) (summarizing studies showing that material wealth has little impact on
subjective well-being); Marilyn Elias, Psychologists Now Know What Makes People Happy, USA
TODAY, Dec. 9, 1992 (quoting psychologist Ed Diener) ("'Materialism is toxic for happiness.'");
Gertner, supra note 12, at 86 (reporting that researchers have found that "wealth above middle-class
comfort makes little difference to our happiness"); David G. Myers, The Funds, Friends, and Faith
of Happy People, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 56, 59 (2000) ("Happiness tends to be lower among the very
poor. Once comfortable, however, more money provides diminishing returns on happiness."). See
generally ROBERT E. LANE, THE Loss OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES (1996)
(demonstrating empirically that increased wealth beyond a poverty level has little to do with a sense
of happiness).
39. See, e.g., LANE, supra note 38, at 6 ("[W]e get happiness primarily from people.
Gertner, supra note 12, at 86 (reporting that researchers have found that "[s]ocial interaction and
friendships have been shown to give lasting pleasure"); Myers, supra note 38, at 62 (reporting results
that "confirm the correlation between social support and well-being").
40. See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL
EXPERIENCE 3 (1990). Csikszentmihalyi notes:
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Company X.
So what is Linda to do? She can certainly raise these issues with Clint.
She could tell him what she knows about the research on affective forecasting.
She could tell him, for example, that people often make poor predictions
about what they want and how happy they will be if they get it. "I think you
ought to know, Clint," she could say, "that no matter what they hope for when
they buy a ticket, many lottery winners end up being no happier than they
were before they won." 41 (Obviously, Linda would be more confident about
her advice-and her advice would be more relevant-if she could speak
specifically to the impact of the impact bias on litigants.)
But besides providing this information to Clint, how hard can Linda push
him to settle the case on the proposed terms? Under the client-centered view
of the lawyer's role, and perhaps even under the applicable ethical rules, she
probably cannot push too hard.4 ' Research drawn from the emerging
movement of hedonic psychology or affective forecasting suggests,4
however, that she should be allowed-and maybe even encouraged-to play a
much more active role in Clint's decision-making. 44
Contrary to what we usually believe, moments like these, the best moments in our lives, are
not the passive, receptive, relaxing times-although such experiences can also be
enjoyable, if we have worked hard to attain them. The best moments usually occur when a
person's body or mind is stretched to its limits in a voluntary effort to accomplish
something difficult and worthwhile.
Id. LYKKEN, supra note 26, at 73-77, 101-16 (exploring how "productive labor" contributes to our
sense of well-being).
41. For a study corroborating this statement, see Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
42. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
43. It is worth noting that at least some of the leaders in this field are reluctant to propose
policy prescriptions based on the underlying research. See Gertner, supra note 12, at 90. Gertner
explains:
We're very, very nervous about overapplying the research .... Just because we figure out
that X makes people happy and they're choosing Y, we don't want to impose X on them. I
have a discomfort with paternalism and with using the results coming out of our field to
impose decisions on people.
Id. (quoting George Loewenstein).
44. It is certainly not unprecedented to argue that the lawyer should play a more active role in
her client's decision making than that envisioned by the proponents of the client-centered approach
to lawyering. For one example, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36
STAN. L. REv. 469, 486, 488 (1984) (observing that his vision of lawyering acknowledges "that
people might have interests of which they are not aware" and that "[t]he precept that the lawyer
further the client's interests, as she understands them, is qualified by the precept that she also try to
enhance the client's capacity to express her own interests"). In this instance, however, the argument
rests on a different basis-i.e., the research on affective forecasting.
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Linda's dilemma is but a microcosm of the broader dilemma faced by
policy makers, regulators, and others trying to facilitate efficient decision-
making in society. The impact bias and other departures from purely
"rational" decision making may warrant intervention by outsiders or
regulation by authorities.4  Open consideration of paternalism of this sort
raises hackles in the legal community at large, and the law and economics
field in particular, because it is deemed taboo to impinge on individual
autonomy and freedom of choice.46
As important as individual autonomy and freedom of choice are, however,
the concerns about paternalism may be misguided for several reasons. First,
as the earlier review of the research on the impact bias demonstrates, freedom
of choice does not necessarily lead to an increase in subjective well-being. In
one illustrative experiment not reported above, researchers found that subjects
who had to make an irrevocable selection between two photographs they had
previously snapped were more satisfied with their choice than were those who
had the option of switching prints later,47 yet when the researchers asked
another group of students whether they would prefer ex ante to make a
revocable or irrevocable choice, two-thirds of them expressed a preference for
the revocable choice. 48 This suggests that in at least some circumstances we
think we want freedom of choice, but we may be happier when our choices
are constrained.
Second, freedom of choice is often illusory because decision making is
rarely independent of a social context shaped by cultural norms,
organizational rules, and the decisions of prior decision makers. Sunstein and
Thaler write:
In many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice
45. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,' 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming).
46. That such a taboo exists suggests the legal system may elevate a logic of appropriateness
over a logic of consequences. See JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: How
DECISIONS HAPPEN 57 (1994). March explains:
When individuals and organizations fulfill identities, they follow rules or procedures that
they see as appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves. Neither preferences
as they are normally conceived nor expectations of future consequences enter directly into
the calculus .... Rule following is grounded in a logic of appropriateness.
Id; see also Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 1222 (referring to the "faith-based antipaternalism
practiced by some legal scholars").
47. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective
Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503 (2002).
48. See id. at 510.
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that will affect the behavior of some other people. There is, in those
situations, no alternative to a kind of paternalism-at least in the form
of an intervention that affects what people choose .... The point
applies to both private and public actors, and hence to those who
49design legal rules as well as to those who serve consumers.
From a practical perspective, then, paternalism is inevitable, so the real
risk is that paternalism might become coercive.
Third, it may be possible, however, to design non-coercive interventions
that facilitate "better" decision making while preserving autonomy at the same
time. 50  Although the research is still at an early stage of development,
researchers have identified three minimally intrusive devices: defaults,
framing, and cooling-off periods.5'
People tend to prefer the status quo, so default options have real force in
choice.52 (Note that defaults cohere exactly to the idea that paternalism is
inevitable-somebody somewhere has decided what will happen if an
individual makes no decision.) For example, employers can increase
employee retirement savings rates by changing the default from non-
enrollment to automatic participation in 401(k) plans.53  This is clearly a
paternalistic intervention, but it is hardly coercive.
People are also influenced by the way options are framed, so society
might try to frame options to induce optimal decisions. In the context of
Linda's representation of Clint, for instance, Linda might emphasize that
settlement reflects a sure gain, while Clint's expected judgment at trial is only
a probabilistic gain. When choosing between a sure gain and a probabilistic
gain with a comparable expected value, most people will choose the sure
thing. By casting Clint's decision as a choice between a sure gain and an
49. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 45, at 7.
50. See Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 1212.
A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make
errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational. Such regulations
are relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best interest, while at
the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices.
Id.
51. Id.
52. For more on this "status quo bias," see William Samuelson & Robert Zeckhauser, Status
Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). For an exploration of its
potential impact on negotiation, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the
Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 795 (2004).
53. See B.C. Madrian & D.F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation
and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149 (2001).
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uncertain gain, Linda implicitly invokes "prospect theory, 54 to increase the
attractiveness of settlement and decrease the attractiveness of trial.55
Society might also employ cooling-off periods between the presentation
of the decision possibilities and the final choice. In negotiation, making the
final decision away from the bargaining table offers two potential benefits.
First, it might reduce the cognitive load on the decision maker at the
bargaining table itself, and research suggests that reducing cognitive load can
increase the accuracy of individuals' affective forecasts.56 Second, a "time
out" might also enable the decision maker to manage his emotions more
effectively. For example, if Clint's motivation in taking Company X to court
was vengeance, then he might overvalue his long-term satisfaction from
hurting the company, especially when he is in the same room as Company X
representatives. Requiring that he wait until he is at a remove might help him
make a better quality decision.
III. CONCLUSION
Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long known that disputants
may not get what they want at the bargaining table. Perhaps what they want is
unreasonable, unavailable, or even unlawful; perhaps they will commit
decision errors in the negotiation process due to "heuristics and biases";
57
perhaps their counterparts will simply "out-negotiate" them using successful
"hard-ball" negotiation tactics 58 or the more subtle but still effective
"principles of influence" employed by advertisers and retailers; 59 perhaps any
number of "barriers" might prevent them from getting what they want.
60
What negotiation scholars and practitioners have generally assumed,
however, is that disputants know what they want. The work reported in this
essay calls this assumption into question. In his interview with the New York
54. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (introducing prospect theory).
55. For more on this, see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 52.
56. For a variety of cooling-off periods provided by consumer protection and family law, see
Camerer et al., supra note 45. For one example of a study in which researchers found that cognitive
load had a negative impact on affective forecasting, see Daniel Gilbert et al., The Future Is Now:
Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting, 88 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430
(2002).
57. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 52.
58. For lists of these tactics, see, for example, ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND
WINNtNG: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 24-25 (2000); Michael
Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiation Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 259, 259-62 (1973).
59. See Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 829 (2004).
60. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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Times Magazine, Gilbert explained it this way, "You know, the Stones said,
'You can't always get what you want.' [But] I don't think that's the problem.
The problem is you can't always know what you want., 6 1 Likewise, the most
significant problem plaguing disputants may very well be that they cannot
always know what they want.
The dilemma for lawyers (who are susceptible to the impact bias in their
own right, of course) 62 is what to do with this insight. In our view, the lawyer
who is truly client-centered will neither substitute her judgment for that of her
client, nor will she turn a blind eye to the very real possibility that her client is
mistaken about what he really wants. Client-centeredness requires her to
eschew extreme paternalism on the one hand and extreme anti-paternalism on
the other in favor of a more balanced approach to legal counseling.
61. Gertner, supra note 12, at 46.
62. In fact, it seems possible that many of the well-documented problems affecting lawyers and
the legal system might be a product of poor affective forecasting. Lawyers who sacrifice personal
relationships, sleep, and outside interests and who care more about their billings than the needs of
their clients or the values they espouse may simply be "miswanting" due to a poor understanding of
the real sources of subjective well-being. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS (1996); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1995); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer,
Know Thyself" A Review of Empirical Researching on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997).
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